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Abstract
The Canadian system of equalization is designed to address di¤erences in
revenue-raising capacity across provinces, basing entitlements on actual provin-
cial tax rates and bases. However, since it does so on a year-on-year basis, the
standard against which a given province’s equalization entitlements are calcu-
lated ‡uctuates from year to year as all provinces’ tax bases and tax rates do.
The consequence is that, while the redistribution function is ful…lled annually,
the risk-sharing function su¤ers. The evidence we present indicates that, at least
for the business income tax, the equalization system can actually be destabiliz-
ing, thereby imposing on provinces variability in their potential revenue streams
that exceeds what would exist in the absence of equalization.




In Canada, as in most federations, uneven …scal capacities of provincial governments
are partially o¤set by the system of federal-provincial equalization transfers. The
size of these transfers is determined through a mechanical formula, which arti…cially
links provincial tax bases and thereby allows provincial governments to share ‡uctu-
ations in each of their individual tax bases. Equalization payments in Canada are
unconditional grants from the federal government to those provinces — the so-called
‘have-not’ provinces — whose tax capacities arebelow a national norm. Speci…cally,
entitlement to equalization is based on the di¤erences between each of a province’s
per capita tax bases and the average per capita tax base of …ve ‘standard’ provinces
(Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia). The di¤er-
ences are calculated for 33 revenue categories, multiplied by the average tax rates
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1in all provinces, and summed up to yield the overall entitlement. The per capita


















where ¿j is national average provincial tax rate for tax base j, b
j
S is per capita tax
base j among the …ve standard provinces, and b
j
k is per capita tax base j in province
k. Equalization entitlements are calculated annually and are …nanced out of federal
general revenues raised throughout the country.
We can identify three types of e¤ects the equalization system has on the budget
of a given province. First, idiosyncratic ‡uctuations in a province’s tax bases are
shared by other provinces through the intermediation of the transfer system. This
is characterized in the literature as the risk-sharing function of inter-regional trans-
fers, the presumption being that the federal government can pool these risks across
provinces through its access to nationwidetax bases (e.g., Bayoumi and Masson 1995,
von Hagen and Hepp 2000, Konrad and Seitz2001). Second, the equalization system
serves a redistribution function by compensating for persistent di¤erences in provin-
cial per capita tax bases (Bayoumi and Masson 1995, von Hagen and Hepp 2000,
Hobson 1998). Third, and somewhat contradictory to the …rst two, provinces might
be subject to shocks in their equalization transfers as a result of changes in policies
and bases in other jurisdictions. This is because equalization entitlements are based
on actual provincial tax bases and tax rates rather than on some federally imposed
standard as in some federations. From this point of view, equalization could actu-
ally be destabilizing from a recipient’s perspective, a prospect recently documented
by Boothe (2001) for Saskatchewan.
Themain purposeofthispaperis to examine the extent to which the equalization
system isin fact destabilizing, and to identify thesources oftheinstability. Wefollow
theliterature in characterizing the risk-sharing e¤ect in termsof…scal ‡ows intended
to o¤set adverse changes in a targeted variable like tax bases or revenues (Bayoumi
and Masson 1995, von Hagen and Hepp 2000). Given this standard de…nition, the
e¤ect of the transfers is destabilizing when the …scal ‡ows co-move with the tax
bases or revenues. The key feature is that changes over time in recipient province
k’s entitlement from a given tax source e
j
k hinge not only on changes in its own tax
base b
j
k but also on changes in both the national average tax rate ¿j the per capita
tax base of the …ve standard provinces b
j
S. For example, even when province k has
a negative shock on b
j
k, which is to be compensated if the risk-sharing function is in
e¤ect, a simultaneous, and possibly independent, negative change in b
j
S may result in
a reduction in e
j
k.
There is a growing empirical literature on the risk-sharing and redistributive per-
formance of …scal transfers. Our approach contrasts with this literature in three
main ways. First, while the literature discusses the issues in terms of per capita
regional income (Bayoumi and Masson 1995, Asdrubali et al. 1996, von Hagen and
Hepp 2000), we focus on provincial tax collections. That is because the equalization
2system is emphatically not meant to be one that addresses di¤erences in individual
incomes. Its purpose is to equalize the ability of provinces to provide comparable
levels of publicservices. Put di¤erently, it is intended to address issues of horizontal
equity, not vertical equity (Boadway and Hobson 1993, 1998). As such, the targeted
variable in the Canadian system is the revenues of the provinces, not the incomes of
individual citizens within a province. The redistributive function involves equaliz-
ing revenue-raising capacities across provinces, and the risk-sharing function involves
providing provinces with more stable and predictable ‡ows of revenues than those
generated from their own sources.
Second, we set aside the redistribution function and concentrate mainly on the
risk-sharing/stabilizing features of equalization. The former has been a major issue
in the literature, but evaluating the redistribution performance of equalization is of
limited concern in Canada. That is because the design of the equalization system
itself (along with other components of the …scal transfer system) is based on a for-
mula that ensures that tax capacities are comprehensively equalized for the have-not
provinces. Thus, the adequacy of the equalization system in addressing the redis-
tribution function is not in question, although there may well be debates about the
normative case for such a function, and the extent to which it should be pursued
(Usher 1995). There is as well a conceptual problem with taking the standard ap-
proach to estimating the redistributive impact of equalization on personal incomes.
One would haveto take account both oftheequalization transfers paid by the federal
government, and the source of general revenues used to …nance the scheme. By fo-
cusing on provincial government revenues, this kind of individual income accounting
is not necessary.
Third, while previous studies analyze aggregate intergovernmental transfers and
regional incomelevels, wedirectly examinethebehaviour ofcomponentsoftheequal-
ization formula itself. The typical approach in the literature is to employ indirect
methods by examining the value of key coe¢cients from either i) regression equa-
tions theoretically derived from intertemporal consumption theory (Asdrubali et al.
1996), or ii) ad hoc regression equations that relate several variations of pre- and
post-transfer values of per capita regional income (Bayoumi and Masson 1995, von
Hagen and Hepp 2000).
Our task is twofold. One is to decompose annual changes in per capita equal-
ization entitlement into those due to annual changes in the three components in the
formula, namely the average tax rate (¿j), the …ve-province standard (b
j
S) and the
own per capita base(b
j
k). Thisenables usto tracethesourceof actual changes in en-
titlementsto these threecomponents, and to evaluate the extent to which the system
has, or has not been, stabilizing. The other is to evaluate the risk-related aspect of
the equalization scheme by examining how equalization payments have responded to
asymmetric contemporaneous shocks to the ten provinces. To do so, we statistically
decompose variations in annual per capita tax base changes in each province into a
shock, or idiosyncratic, element and a structural element. The former are used to
determine the response of the equalization transfers to the shocks. In particular, we
analyze whether the response to these idiosyncratic shocks taken together are stabi-
3lizing or destabilizing with respect to have-not province equalization entitlements.
Our analysis is relevant only for those provinces that actually received transfers,
which over the entire period of our analysis included Newfoundland, Prince Edward
Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. These
provinces had a positive overall entitlement for equalization,
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0. For the remaining three provinces — Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia
—
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k) < 0 for all periods. These provinces are not insured against
idiosyncratic shocks, nor are they subject to shocks arising elsewhere in the country.
In addition, we limit our analysis to a single tax base, business income, which is one
forwhich idiosyncratic shocks arelikely to berelatively more prevalent. Ouranalysis
is not based on equalization payments to the provinces that are aggregated over all
33 revenue categories, but on changes in entitlement that originates in that single
revenue category. As such, implications for risk sharing and exposure to exogenous
shocks may be di¤erent for the actual equalization mechanism where shocks to the
33 tax bases are aggregated.
The Canadian equalization system is designed primarily with the restribution
function in mind. Our results show that in attempting to achieve redistribution
on a year-by-year basis, the system sacri…ces its risk-sharing role. At least for the
busniess tax, equalization transfers are actually destabilizing, and that is due to
fact that a recipient province’s entitlement depends on changes in the …ve-province
standard base and the national average tax rate, both of which exhibit instability.
Although we focus only on the busniesstax base, the present study should provide an
exemplary method for analyzing the risk-related aspects of the interprovincial …scal
equalization mechanism more generally. Our analysis, in principle, can be extended
to include other important tax bases that are considered in the equalization formula.
Thepaperproceeds asfollows. Inthenext section, wediscussourdata sourceand
take a preliminary look at the relevant statistical correlations in the data. Then, we
decomposechanges inbusinesstax entitlements into thethreecomponentsmentioned
above and discuss the implications. Following that, weestimate the part of tax base
changes in each province that are due to idiosyncratic shocks and calculate how the
equalization system responded to them. Finally, we o¤er some conclusions.
2 A Preliminary Look at the Data
The data weuse areobtained from FinanceCanada. They include the raw data used
to calculate annual equalization entitlements for all provinces and revenue sources
from 1967-98. Theseincluderevenuebases and revenuesobtained from all 33 revenue
sources used in the representative tax system and for all ten provinces, as well as
provincial populations. These data are su¢cient to compute national average tax
rates (the sum of provincial revenues divided by the sum of provincial tax bases for
each revenue source) and the …ve-province standard per capita tax base (the sum of
thetax bases in the…vestandard provinces divided by thesum oftheirpopulations).
Notethat, whiletheprovincial revenuesarethoseactually collected in each provinces,
the tax bases do not re‡ect those used by the provinces. Instead, a standardized
4de…nition of the tax base is used so that meaningful di¤erences between provinces
can be used as the basis for entitlements.
In using thesedata, threecaveats should be borne in mind in what follows. First,
we de‡ate all our variables (per capita tax base b
j
k, per capita tax collection r
j
k from
the base, and the …ve-province standard per capita tax base b
j
S) by the 1992 implicit
price de‡ator so as to net out the e¤ects of price changes over time. Second, the
entitlements for all 31 years are calculated using the current formula. Prior to
1982, the equalization formula was somewhat di¤erent. For example, a ten-province
standard was in e¤ect rather than the present …ve-province one. This allows us to
draw comparisons over thewhole period using a consistent equalization system. One
might object that thisprocedurescausesproblemstotheextent that thetax basesand
tax rates might themselves have been di¤erent had a di¤erent equalization formula
been in e¤ect. Third, the entitlements data we useare …nal …gures, whilethe annual
volumes of the transfers initially paid are based upon preliminary estimates. The
di¤erence between the preliminary and …nal …gures are adjusted, but the calcuation
of the …nal …gures takes a few years to complete. As such, our analysis is applied
to the due amounts that the equalization formula is supposed to deliver. It is not
clear in principle whether these …nal …gures are more or less volatile that the initial
estimates. In any case, we expect that the di¤erences between the two is not large
enough to signi…cantly e¤ect our qualitative results.
The average tax rate ¿j and the …ve-province standard base b
j
S are calculated
with the quantities of revenues and bases of individual provinces in a given year. As
such, they ‡uctuate from year to year. More important, by the very way those two
values are calculated, they constitute routes through which changes in tax policies
and bases in one province in‡uencethe payments the have-not provinces are entitled
to receive. This interdependency makes it relevant to consider the prospect of the
destabilizing e¤ect of equalization payments.
To take a preliminary look, let us examine how each province’s per capita equal-
izationentitlementsrespond to variationsin itspercapitarevenues, simply by looking
at correlation coe¢cients between the relevant variables. Since we focus on a single
revenue source — business income — we can from now on drop the superscript j
that indexes the tax base. Instead, we add a time subscript t since we are examin-
ing changes over time. We can then express the per capita entitlement accruing to
province k in year t as:
ekt = ¿t ¢ (bSt ¡bkt): (1)
From the data, we can indeed discern a destabilizing, rather than stabilizing, ef-
fect of the equalization system. Table 1 shows three sets of correlation coe¢cients
for the seven equalization receiving provinces, along with P values (in parentheses)
which indicate two-tail marginal statistical signi…cance. The …rst column shows the
correlation between per capita equalization entitlements and per capita revenues for
theseven provinces. To the extent that equalization is intended to compensate for a
loss in provincial tax revenues, we would expect these coe¢cients to be negative. In
fact, all correlation coe¢cients exhibit positive values for business income revenues.
More speci…cally, thecorrelations for the …ve provinces other than Quebec and Man-
5itoba are statistically signi…cant at the :025 level, while entitlements and revenues
are statistically uncorrelated for these two provinces. Such a …nding, which mirrors
that found by Boothe (2001) for the aggregate of all revenues sources in the case of
Saskatchewan, may come as a surprise. It would imply that, contrary to its intent,
theequalization system is actually destabilizing, at least with respect to business tax
revenues.
This …nding is, however, premature. Business tax revenues are to some extent
a¤ected by the tax policies of the provincial governments, so the correlation could
re‡ect the e¤ect of policy changes. The equalization system is intended to compen-
sate for changes in the potential to raise revenues rather than the actual revenues
themselves. A more relevant correlation might be that between equalization enti-
tlements and provincial tax bases. Although the latter might still be in‡uenced by
provincial tax policies, they presumably more closely re‡ect revenue-raising potential
than do actual tax revenues. Alternatively, another correlation worth considering
would be between the entitlements and some standarized revenue-raising capacities.
Here, we can employ per capita tax base evaluated at the national average tax rate,
¿tbkt. Di¤erences in these are, after all, what the equalization system attempts to
compensate for.
The second column ofTable 1 then shows the correlation coe¢cients between per
capita equalization entitlements and per capita business income tax bases for each
of the have-not provinces. Given (1), we would expect that the negative correlation
holds, more so than for the per capita tax revenues. The results, however, arerather
mixed. For four provinces (New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan)
the correlations are negative as expected, but they are positive for the remaining
three provinces (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia). At the
:05 level, the negative correlations for Quebec and Saskatchewan and the positive
correlations for Newfoundland and Nova Scotia arestatistically signi…cant. The two
variables for the other three provinces — Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and
Manitoba — are judged to be statistically uncorrelated.
The third column of Table 1 lists the correlation coe¢cients between the entitle-
ments and the standarized revenue capacities, per capita tax base evaluated at the
national average tax rate, ¿tbkt. Rewriting (1) as ekt = ¿tbSt ¡ ¿tbkt, we would
again expect that the negative correlation holds, even more so than for the two vari-
ables above. The results, however, are again mixed. Now the negative correlations
are seen only for two provinces – Quebec and Saskatchewan, and only the former is
statistically signi…cant at the standard levels. The correlations are positive for the
remaining …ve provinces (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick and Manitoba). The correlations for New Brunswick and Manitoba are
insigni…cant at the :05 level, and only the latter is so at the 0:10 level.
TheresultsofTable1 suggest that theequalization system may destabilize, rather
than stabilize, provincial revenues over time. To obtain a rough indication of its
destabilizing e¤ect, we calculate the standard deviations and the average values of
pre-equalized per capita revenue rkt and those of post-equalized per capita revenue
rkt + ekt for the seven provinces in Table 2. The descriptive statistics indeed in-
6dicate that post-equalized revenues are more volatile than pre-equalized revenues,
with substantive increases in the standard deviations for most of the provinces. Of
course, sincethoseprovinces arerecipients, themeanvalues are larger aftertheequal-
ization. We also calculate the analogous descriptive statistics of the pre-equalized
standarized per capita revenue ¿tbkt and those of post-equalized per capita revenue
¿tbkt +ekt = ¿tbkt +(¿tbSt ¡ ¿tbkt) = ¿tbSt. Notice that the latter variable and
the statistics calculated for it are common for all the recipient provinces. The re-
sults again indicate that, except for Quebec, post-equalized potential revenues are
more volatile than pre-equalized potential revenues, with increases in the standard
deviations resulting from the equalization system.
3 Decomposing Changes in Equalization Entitlements
The results of the previous section indicated that provincial entitlements et might
behave rather perversely with respect to changes in a province’s own tax base bkt.
Since these two factors are negatively related in the formula for entitlements, this
implies that the perverse outcomes must be due to the in‡uence of the other two
components oftheformula, changesintheaveragetax rate ¿t and in the…ve-province
standard bSt. Our next task is to quantify these in‡uences. To do so, we decompose
annual changes in et into annual changes in the three components, namely, ¿t, bSt
and bkt. It turns out that, given the multiplicative natureof the entitlement formula
— ek (¿;bS;bk) ´¿ ¢ (bS ¡bk) — an exact decomposition can be done. To interpret
this decomposition in terms of the in‡uence of each of the three components, we
assume that we can treat each of them as independent in the equalization formula.
In fact, the national average tax rate ¿ is constructed using the tax bases of the
provinces, so we are ignoring whatever interdependency this gives rise to. This will
be legitimate to the extent that the determination of the national average tax rate
is based on provincial tax rates rather than their bases, which will be the case when
provincial business income tax rates are proportional. This seems like a good …rst
approximation.1
For di¤erential changes, we obtain the total derivative dek (¿;bS;bk) = (bS ¡
bk)d¿ +¿dbS ¡¿dbk. For the discrete annual changes that we are dealing with, we
can use a Taylor approximation to obtain the relevant discrete analogue. Given the
multiplicative form of the expression for ek (¿; bS; bk), a second-order Taylor expres-
sion will be exact since all third derivatives vanish.









k sk¿k where nk is population, rk is per capita revenue, ¿ k is individual
average tax rate, and sk ´ nkbk=
P
nkbk is tax base share, all for province k. The last expression
illustrates that the tax rate of a province has an in‡uence on the national average tax rate to the
extent of its tax base share. As such, for most have-not provinces with smaller tax base share, the
e¤ect of their own tax rate changes on the national average are not likely to be signi…cant. The per
capita tax base may well in‡uence the individual average tax rates as well. However, if provincial
taxes are proportional, then ¿k is constant and independent of changes in individual per capita tax
bases, which may not be an unreasonable assumption. If this assumption is maintained, we could, in
principle, decompose changes in ¿ =
P
k sk¿ k into that due to the own province’s tax rate changes
and that due to tax base changes (via changes in sk).
7Applying a second-order Taylor expansion to the time-dependent expression for
equalization entitlements ek (¿t;bSt;bkt) yields two alternative expressions:
¢ekt = (bSt ¡bkt) ¢ ¢¿t +¿t¡1 ¢ ¢bSt ¡¿t¡1 ¢ ¢bkt
¢ekt = (bSt¡1 ¡bkt¡1) ¢ ¢¿t +¿t ¢ ¢bSt ¡¿t ¢ ¢bkt:
where¢ekt ´ekt¡ekt¡1, ¢¿t ´¿t¡¿t¡1, ¢bSt ´ bSt¡bSt¡1 and ¢bkt ´bkt¡bkt¡1.2
They represent two alternative ways of decomposing changes in entitlements into
those due to the three components. The coe¢cients will di¤er slightly because of
the di¤erent time periods used to construct them. In fact, combining these two
expressions, thechangein ekt can beevaluated at theaverage valueofthecoe¢cients
over the time periods involved (t and t ¡1):
¢ekt =®kt¢¿t +¯kt¢bSt ¡°kt¢bkt: (2)
where®kt ´[(bSt¡bkt)+(bSt¡1¡bkt¡1)]=2, ¯kt ´(¿t+¿t¡1)=2and°kt ´ (¿t+¿t¡1)=2.
This is what we use for our decomposition.3
Panels a–g in Figure 1 depict graphically the results of the decompositions calcu-
lated using (2) for the seven recipients. The solid squares show the values for ¢ekt
during each ofthe calendar years. As these indicate, there is considerable variability
from one year to the next in per capita entitlements from this revenue source. The
vertical bars consist of three segments that show the values for ®kt¢¿t, ¯kt¢bSt and
¡°kt¢bkt. Those components with positive values appear above the horizontal axis,
while those with negative values appear below. Naturally, all three add up to ¢ekt.
Figure 1
As can be seen, in most years, there are both negative and positive components
regardlessofthesignof¢ekt. For all seven provinces, theimpactsofthe…ve-province
standard (bSt) are relatively large, usually exceeding the impacts of own tax bases
(bkt). The average tax rates (¿t) is the least in‡uential among the three, but it still
2The second-order Taylor expansion results in: ek(¿t¡1 + ¢¿t;bSt¡1 + ¢bSt; bkt¡1 + ¢bkt) =
ek(¿ t¡1; bSt¡1; bkt¡1) +(bSt¡1 ¡ bkt¡1)¢¿t + ¿ t¡1¢bSt ¡ ¿ t¡1¢bkt + ¢¿ t¢bSt ¡¢¿t¢bkt: Noting
ekt = ek(¿ t¡1 +¢¿t;bSt¡1 + ¢bSt; bkt¡1 + ¢bkt) and collecting terms, the above expression yields
the two expression in the text. Actually, since the second-order expansion is exact, we do not
really need a Taylor expansion to obtain these decompositions. Noting that by de…nition ¢ekt ´
¿ t ¢(bSt ¡bkt)¡¿ t¡1 ¢ (bSt¡1 ¡bkt¡1), we see that straightforward rearrangement of this expression
results in either of the two decompositions.
3For have-not provinces that are part of the …ve-province standard (i.e., Quebec, Manitoba and
Saskatchewan), their own base will also to some extent a¤ect the …ve province standard. To account






where wit is a
population share and b
¡k
St ´ bSt ¡ wktbkt. The …rst-order approximation analogous to Eq. (2)













¡[(1¡wkt)¢¿ t+(1¡wkt¡1)¢¿ t¡1]=2, ¢wkt ´ wkt¡wkt¡1 and Ákt ´ (wktbkt+wkt¡1bkt¡1)=2. While
this decomposition does not yield an exact approximation given a third-order term (i.e., ¿ twktbkt)
in the formula, its performance is almost accurate with the largest error of 1:5% (and most of the
errors are less than :1%). The general results, however, are not so di¤erent from the case in the text.
The details are provided by the authors upon requiest.
8exerts substantial impacts. We can summarize these variations taking advantage of
the variance decomposition of (2), namely:
Var(¢ekt) = Var(®kt¢¿t) +Var(¯kt¢bSt) +Var(¡°kt¢bkt)
+2¢ Cov(®kt¢¿t;¯kt¢bSt) +2 ¢ Cov(®kt¢¿t; ¡°kt¢bkt)
+2¢ Cov(¯kt¢bSt; ¡°kt¢bkt) :
Table3 lists the variance-covariance components normalized by Var(¢ekt). It shows
that changes due to the …ve-province standard (¯kt¢bSt) ‡uctuate more than those
due to own per capita tax bases (¡°kt¢bkt), except for New Brunswick. The vari-
ations in both of those two components are signi…cantly larger than those in the
national average tax rate ®kt¢¿t. However, the large ‡uctuation of the former two
do not materializeinto changesin theequalization entitlements, sincethetwo compo-
nents areinversely correlated to a sizableextent, as indicated by thefar right column
in the table.
To the extent that theequalization system is intended to insureagainst changesin
each province’s own tax capacity, we would expect an increase in ekt to compensate
for revenue losses from own tax base reductions. While an exact o¤set (¢ekt =
¡°kt¢bkt) is not expected since the average tax rate and the …ve-province standard
‡uctuate over time (¢¿t 6= 0 and ¢bSt 6= 0), we might expect at least some degree
of compensation to a base change. If so, the majority of the cases would involve
¢et ¢ ¢bkt > 0 with either (a) ‘under-compensation’ where equalization payments
o¤set less than a change in the base necessitates (i.e., abs(¢et) < abs(¡°kt¢bkt)),
or (b) ‘over-compensation’ where the o¤set is more than necessary (i.e., abs(¢et) >
abs(¡°kt¢bkt)). However, this is not the case ifwe eyeball the ‡uctuations in Figure
1.
Table4 summarizes the results fortheseven provincefor the31 periods. Thema-
jority of thecases areidenti…ed as adverse oneswhere where the entitlements and the
tax bases move in the same direction. More speci…cally, there are ‘depriving’ cases,
denoted (c1), where a loss in own tax base is accompanied by a decrease in transfer
payments (¢bkt <0 and ®kt¢¿t +¯kt¢bSt <°kt¢bkt), and ‘unnecessary compensa-
tion’cases, denoted (c2), where a province obtains an increase in entitlements when
there is an increase in its own tax base (¢bkt >0 and ®kt¢¿t +¯kt¢bSt >°kt¢bkt).
These adverse cases are mainly explained by the in‡uence of the …ve-province stan-
dard tax base bSt (and to lesser extent the average tax rates ¿t). Recall that the
primary purpose of the scheme is to ‘equalize’ tax capacities of receiving provinces to
thestandard in a singleperiod, not to insure against revenue losses over periods. As
per capita tax bases change in the …vestandard provinces, the…ve-provincestandard
changes over time, and can do so in an erratic way relative to the per capita tax
base of a recipient province. This may also explain why unnecessary compensation
occupies the majority of the period forall seven provinces. Whenthestandard grows
faster than tax base of a recipient, an equalizing scheme may compensate even if the
latter grows. Such compensation may be unnecessary as an insurance device, but it
does sevre as an equalizing device satisfying the redistribution function.
94 Responses to Asymmetric Shocks
While the results of the previous section may well be indicative of the destabilizing
properties of equalization payments, they do not have direct implications for its
risk-sharing function. The risk-sharing function of a transfer scheme is typically
characterized in the literature in terms of its response to unpredictable asymmetric
shocks. For example, Bayoumi and Masson (1995) identify the risk-sharing role
with the degree of response to temporary deviations from the growth path of …scal
capacities. In addition, von Hagen and Hammond (1998) argue that the case for
insurance is based on the existence of temporary and asymmetric shocks. Fiscal
transfers as a risk-sharing mechanism should be paid in response to shocks that are
both asymmetric and serially uncorrelated. In the previous section, we considered
the response of equalization payments to annual changes in the three components of
thetransfer scheme, namely, the recipient province’s per capita tax base, thenational
average tax rate and the …ve-province standard tax base. However, changes in the
per capita tax bases are not generally asymmetric and serially uncorrelated. They
includepersistent changes that arise because of changes in thelevel and distribution
of provincial tax bases. The redistribution function of equalization is imeant to deal
with these. To evaluate the extent to which the equalization system acts purely as
a risk-sharing device, we need to focus on those changes in per capita tax bases that
represent asymmetric and serially uncorrelated — that is, idiosyncratic — shocks.
Our …rst task is to identify the set ofsuch idiosyncraticshocks or ‘innovations’ to
the per capita tax bases. To obtain some plausible estimates, we take a time-series
approach and model annual changes in the per capita business tax base in province
i (¢bit) as the following AR(p) process:




wherethe½is’s(s =1;¢¢¢; p) arecoe¢cients, ²it is an independently distributed shock
and ct is the common component that identically a¤ects all provinces. We use a
set of residuals ^ ²0
t ´ [^ ²1t ^ ²2t ^ ²3t ^ ²4t ^ ²5t ^ ²6t ^ ²7t ^ ²8t ^ ²9t ^ ²10t] from the regression as the
‘historical’ shocks on which our characterization will be based. Note that for the
residuals to be asymmetric, we require
P
i2P ^ ²it =0 for a given t.
To estimate (3), we use our panel of per capita business income bases for the
10 provinces over the period 1969–98. Notice that the common component ct may
include both deterministic and stochastic factors. The deterministic factor may
consist of a common trend as well as some common structural changes, while the
stochastic factor may include a nation-wide contemporaneous shock that a¤ects the
ten provinces identically at the same time. These factors are captured all together
by the inclusion of timedummies for individual years. Coe¢cients on such dummies
are considered to be the estimates for ct.
Wealso allow individual coe¢cients ½is’stotakedi¤erent valuesover theprovinces
(i =1; ¢¢¢;10). Therefore, our panel estimation isin e¤ect identical to the estimation
of a system of ten di¤erent regression equations that are restricted by the common
10factor (ct). When estimated with our pooled data, the model utilizes regional dum-
mies to yield provincial …xed e¤ects (½i0) as well as the individual slope coe¢cients
(½is). Notethat the…xede¤ects(½i0) aremeant tocapturepersistent province-speci…c
e¤ects that are re‡ected in annual changes in equalization entitlement. Of course,
one of the dummies must be excluded to avoid the singularity problem (or perfect
collinearity). We chose to exclude the provincial dummy for British Columbia. As
such, all of the common time e¤ects (coe¢cients on the time dummies) should be
interpreted to include the regional e¤ect for British Columbia.
Given theshort length of the time series (30 annual observations), we began with
small values for the time lag p. We …rst tested the model with p = 1 against the
model with p = 2, and could not reject the former with a large P value of :9836.
We therefore opted for the model with p = 1. Furthermore, we tested the model
without either of the two sets of …xed e¤ects, given p = 1. We statistically rejected
the case without the time dummies with a P value of :0000. This suggests that
there is a nation-wide common factor that partly explains annual changes in the per
capita tax bases. On the other hand, we cannot reject the model that excludes
the province dummies with a P value of :9965. This may suggest dispensing with
provincial dummies, but wechosenot todo so. Thisisbecausewearemoreconcerned
with creating residuals ^ ²t than with obtaining the parameter estimates. Including
provincial dummiesmakes theset ofresidualsasymmetricin thesense that
P
i^ ²it =0
holds for any t. In addition, this makes it easier to interpret the results of our
exercise. Therefore, we use the results from the model with p = 1 with both the
time and provincial dummies included. The estimates are listed in Table 5.
Table 5
We interpret the residuals ^ ² ´ f^ ²tg1998
t=1969 obtained from the regression of (3)
with p = 1 as the random-shock portion of ¢bit. These shocks to the tax base
induce changes both in the revenue-raising capability of the provinces and in their
equalization entitlements. The question of concern to us is the extent to which the
latter o¤sets the former for equalization-receiving provinces. We can calculate the
corresponding variations in equalization entitlements ¢ekt induced by these random
shocks, denoted ¢ekt(^ ²t), as:4
¢ekt(^ ²t) =
P
i2P nit¡1¿it¡1 ¢ (bit¡1 +^ ²it)
P
i2P nit¡1 ¢ (bit¡1 +^ ²it)
£
ÃP






A standardized measure for the change in revenue-raising ability caused by a shock






4Recall that we ignore plausible correlation between ¿ and b for the reason stated before.
11This is simply the change in revenue that would be raised using national average tax
rates.
De…ne the di¤erence between the standardized measure for the revenue change
and the change in entitlement due to shocks as:
dkt ´¿t¡1^ ²kt ¡¢ekt(^ ²t)





For the equalization formula to perfectly o¤set the shocks, we require dkt = 0 or
¸kt = ¡1. This will be the case when the average tax rate ¿ and the …ve-province
standard bS are …xed at some values, say, at ¿0 and b0
S.5 However, the perfect
o¤setting is not generally the casesince ¿ and bS are not …xed but ‡uctuatewith the
shocks that occur to the other provinces as well. In other words, all of the elements
in ^ ²t propagate throughout the equalization system via ¿ and bS so that unexpected
changes may occur to ekt in relation to ^ ²kt.
We have calculated ¿t¡1^ ²kt, ¢eit(^ ²t), dkt and ¸kt for the ten provinces for the
period from 1969–1998, where, as earlier, the formula in place since 1982 is used
to calculate entitlements. The results for pre-1982 …scal years are interpreted as
counter-factual cases that show what the responses would have been if the current
formula had been applied. We list the results for ¸kt in Table 6.6 The ratios in the
table would takeon values of¡1 if theshocks wereperfectly o¤set, and will becloser
to ¡1 to the extent the o¤setting works appropriately. A rough look at the tables,
however, implies that the equalization system has performed far from perfectly as a
risk-sharing device. There are relatively few cases where the ratio is close to ¡1.
For example, there areonly eleven cases out of210 (seven provinces £30 …scal years)
where the ratio is such that ¡1:1 ￿ ¸kt ￿ ¡:9 (Newfoundland 1988, 89; PEI 1988,
89, 98; Nova Scotia 1988, 89; New Brunswick 1988; Quebec 1989; Manitoba 1988;
Saskatchewan 1989). In addition, there are 49 cases (almost a quarter of the total
number) with positive values which implies that changes in the entitlements and the
innovations moved in the same direction.
Table 6
Table 7 summarizes more detailed results, classifying the cases into the following
eight categories by the directions and volumes of ¿t¡1^ ²it, ¢ekt(^ ²t) and dkt. Figure 2
is a graphical representation of these eight patterns.
Case a: A decrease in revenue-raising (¿t¡1^ ²it < 0) with an under-o¤setting transfer
(¢ekt(^ ²t) >0, dkt <0), which is stabilizing (abs(dkt) <abs(¿t¡1^ ²it))
5Then, using (4), we obtain ¢ekt(²t) = ¿
0 ¢ (b
0







6The results for ¿ t¡1^ ²kt, ¢eit(^ ²t) and dkt are provided by the authors upon request.
12Case b: A decrease in revenue-raising (¿t¡1^ ²it < 0) with a transfer that is over-
o¤setting (¢ekt(^ ²t) > 0, dkt > 0) but stabilizing (abs(dkt) <abs(¿t¡1^ ²it))
Case c: A decrease in revenue-raising (¿t¡1^ ²it < 0) with a transfer that is over-
o¤setting (¢ekt(^ ²t) > 0, dkt > 0) and destabilizing (abs(dkt) >abs(¿t¡1^ ²it))
Case d: A decreasesinrevenue-raisingwitha reducedtransfer(¿t¡1^ ²it <0, ¢ekt(^ ²t) <
0), which is destabilizing (abs(dkt) >abs(¿t¡1^ ²it))
Case e: An increasein revenuie-raising (¿t¡1^ ²it >0) with an under-o¤setting trans-
fer (¢ekt(^ ²t) < 0, dkt > 0), which is stabilizing (abs(dkt) <abs(¿t¡1^ ²it))
Case f: An increase in revenuie-raising (¿t¡1^ ²it > 0) with a transfer that is over-
o¤setting (¢ekt(^ ²t) < 0, dkt < 0) but stabilizing (abs(dkt) <abs(¿t¡1^ ²it))
Case g: An increase in tax base (¿t¡1^ ²it > 0) with a transfer that is over-o¤setting
(¢ekt(^ ²t) <0, dkt <0) and destabilizing (abs(dkt) >abs(¿t¡1^ ²it))
Case h: An increase in revenue-raising (¿t¡1^ ²it > 0) with an increased transfer
(¢ekt(^ ²t) >0), which is destabilizing (abs(dkt) >abs(¿t¡1^ ²it))
The ‘destabilizing’ cases refers to the cases where a change in the standardized
revenue(¿t¡1^ ²it) islargerthana concurrent changein thestandardized post-equalized
revenue (dkt), both measured in absolute value. In these cases, changes in post-
equalized provincial revenues will be more volatile than in pre-equalized revenues.
Cases c, d, g and h are the destabilizing cases, and, among them, Case d and Case h
parallel respectively with ‘depriving case’ and ‘unnecessary compensation’ that were
explained in the previous section.
Table 7 & Figure 2
Table 7 marks the destabilizing cases with darker shades (lighter shades indi-
cate non-recipient provinces). As shown, the seven equalization receiving provinces
experience destabilizing e¤ects more often than not during the period we examine
(111 out of the total of 210 cases). Out of the 30 years, there were 17 destabiliz-
ing years for Newfoundland (57%), 11 for PEI (37%), 18 for Nova Scotia (60%), 13
for New Brunswick (43%), 21 for Quebec (70%), 18 for Manitoba (60%) and 13 for
Saskatchewan (43%). The two perverse cases of d (depriving) and h (unnecessary
compensation) occurred quite often in Quebec and Manitoba, with Case h the most
frequent and Case d the second most frequent.
Recall that these are the responses to asymmetric shocks that are constructed to
sum up to zero across provinces in each year. In other words, those shocks should
cancel each out other if a proper transfer arrangement is in e¤ect. The frequency of
the non-perfect o¤setting in Table 6 and the destabilizing cases in Table 7 imply a
weak risk-sharing function of the equalization scheme.
As mentioned, the main reasons for this poor performance is that the average
rate and the standard base are also in‡uenced by the shocks. Although it is di¢cult
13to obtain analytically the pattern of changes in ¿it and bSt caused by ^ ²t, we may
numerically obtain such changes as
¢¿t =
P
i2P nit¡1¿it¡1 ¢ (bit¡1 +^ ²it)
P
i2P nit¡1 ¢ (bit¡1 +^ ²it)
¡¿t¡1
for the national average tax rate and
¢bSt =
P




forthe…ve-provincestandard. Calculatingthechangesdueto non-innovation sources
as ¢¿t ¡¢¿t and ¢bSt ¡¢bSt, Figures 3 and 4 decompose annual changes in the
average tax rate and the …ve-province standard into changes due to ^ ²t and those due
to the other sources. In both cases, the tables clearly show that in most of the times
theasymmetricshock elements account for thoseannual changesmore than theother
sources of the changes.
Figures 3–4
5 Concluding Remarks
The Canadian constitution commits the federal government to the ‘principle of mak-
ing equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have su¢cient rev-
enues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably com-
parable levels of taxation’. This admonition is consistent with the economic ar-
guments for equalization that originated in the classic contributions by Buchanan
(1950, 1952), and that were developed with the Canadian case in mind by Graham
(1964) and Boadway and Flatters (1982). The core argument is that in a decen-
tralized federation, comparable citizens residing in di¤erent provinces would receive
di¤erent ‘net …scal bene…ts’ (NFBs) from their respective provincial governments.
These di¤erences in NFBs would provide an incentive for ine¢cient …scally induced
migration between provinces, and would also result in a violation ofhorizontal equity
across provinces. The remedy calls for equalization payments among provinces to
o¤set these di¤erences in NFBs. In certain stylized circumstances (e.g., provincial
tax rates on residents are roughly proportional to incomes, while bene…ts of provin-
cial public services are independent of income), full equalization of revenue-raising
capacity is optimal.7 The Canadian system of equalization is designed to address
di¤erences in revenue-raising capacity across provinces. That is, it focuses entirely
on the redistributive function of equalization.
Consistent with that objective of erasing NFB di¤erentials, the equalization sys-
tem basesentitlements on actual provincial tax rates and bases. But, because it does
7Moreover, to the extent thatprovincial public services are targetted to particular types of persons
(the elderly, the ill, the young, etc.), equalization ought to compensate for di¤erences across provinces
in the proportions of persons of these di¤erent types, referred to as di¤erences in need. The Canadian
equalization system, unlike that in many other federations, is based solely on revenue equalization.
14so on a year-on-year basis, thestandard against which a given province’s equalization
entitlementsarecalculated ‡uctuatesfrom year to year as all provinces’ tax bases and
tax rates do. The consequence is that, while the redistribution function is ful…lled
annually, the risk-sharing function su¤ers. The evidence we have presented in this
paper indicatesthat, at least forthebusiness incometax, theequalization system can
actually be destabilizing, thereby imposing on provinces variability in their revenue
streams that exceeds what would exist in the absence of equalization.
To restore the stabilization function of equalization, there must be some persis-
tence in thestandard used to calculateeach province’s entitlement. Ifthestandardis
stable, thesystem should succeed in sharing the risks arising from independent asym-
metric shocks to the province’s own base. There are two ways that the standard
could be made less variable. One is for the federal government to use something
other than an aggregate of actual provincial outcomes to set the standard. This
might be unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it would imply that equalization
entitlements did not re‡ect actual di¤erences in NFBs, which is the purpose of the
equalization system in principle. Second, ifthefederal government is given discretion
for setting the equalization standard, it opens the possibility that standard becomes
part of the annual budgetary policy of the federal government, which itself can lead
to unpredictability and uncertainty on the part of the provinces. An alternative
approach might be to retain theuse of actual provincial tax rates and bases to deter-
mine the standard, but to smooth out ‡uctuations in entitlements by some method
of averaging over time. Thus, payments might be based not on currently calculated
national standards, but on some moving average of past national standards. Such a
procedure could retain the important redistributive function of equalization while at
the same timeallowing it to ful…l a risk-sharing role. An interesting topic for future
research might be to examine if this is the case by following the methodology in this
paper with a speci…c formula that incorporates such a moving average in place of the
current formula.
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Figure 1. Decomposition of Entitlement Changes (Business Income Taxes) 
 
Panel a. Newfoundland          Panel b. Price Edward Island 
 
Panel c. Nova Scotia          Panel d. New Brunswick 
 
Panel e. Quebec           Panel f. Manitoba 
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































     Changes due to those in the average tax rates 
     Changes due to those in the standard tax base 
     Changes due to those in the own tax base 
 




Figure 2. Response Patterns 
 
Notes:   
1) The shaded box (below or above the zero horizontal line) shows the initial change in the tax base. 
2) The distance from the zero horizontal line to the dotted lines is identical to the absolute value of the tax base 
change. 













Figure 3. Decomposition of Changes in the National Average Tax Rate 
 
 
Figure 4. Decomposition of Changes in the Five-Province Standard 










































































































































































































































Table 1. Correlation coefficients 



















































Table 2. Means and standard deviations 
  rkt  rkt+ekt 
  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean 
Newfoundland  34.43    118.24    62.29    238.53   
Prince Edward Island  43.38    107.38    71.09    228.97   
Nova Scotia  35.54    105.65    64.99    216.38   
New Brunswick  59.92    119.85    90.21    217.64   
Quebec  48.39    144.82    53.19    164.15   
Manitoba  41.01    160.75    63.66    231.66   
Saskatchewan  183.77    275.51    202.88    333.99   
  ttbkt  ttbkt +ekt=ttbSt 
  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean 
Newfoundland  33.03    95.40    66.69    215.69   
Prince Edward Island  36.89    94.10    66.69    215.69   
Nova Scotia  33.60    104.96    66.69    215.69   
New Brunswick  46.94    117.91    66.69    215.69   
Quebec  75.91    196.36    66.69    215.69   
Manitoba  39.09    144.79    66.69    215.69   




Table 3. Variance decomposition: 1968-1998 
  Var(aDt) /Var(De)  Var(bDbS)/Var(De) Var(-gDb)/Var(De)   
Newfoundland  0.29  1.75  0.53   
Prince Edward Island  0.18  1.07  0.57   
Nova Scotia  0.23  1.68  0.88   
New Brunswick  0.06  0.59  1.23   
Quebec  0.06  5.71  4.90   
Manitoba  0.14  2.25  0.95   
Saskatchewan  0.07  1.35  1.07   





/Var(De)  Var(De)/Var(De) 
Newfoundland  -0.22  0.08  -1.42  1.00 
Prince Edward Island  -0.15  0.00  -0.67  1.00 
Nova Scotia  -0.20  0.14  -1.73  1.00 
New Brunswick  -0.06  0.05  -0.87  1.00 
Quebec  -0.26  0.21  -9.63  1.00 
Manitoba  -0.19  0.11  -2.27  1.00 




Table 4. The summary of the decomposition  
  Nfld  PEI  NS  NB  Que  Man  Sask 
1968  c2    c2    c2    c2    c2    c2    b   
1969  b    c2    c2    c2    c2    b    b   
1970  c1    c1    c1    c1    c1    c1    c1   
1971  b    b    a    a    c2    b    a   
1972  c2    c2    c2    c2    c2    a    a   
1973  c2    c2    c2    c2    a    c2    c2   
1974  c2    c2    c2    c2    c2    a    c2   
1975  c1    c1    c1    c1    c1    c1    b   
1976  a    b    a    a    b    b    a   
1977  b    b    b    b    a    a    b   
1978  c2    b    c2    b    c2    c2    a   
1979  c2    a    c2    a    a    c2    b   
1980  b    b    a    a    a    a    b   
1981  c1    c1    c1    c1    c1    c1    c1   
1982  c1    c1    c1    c1    c1    c1    a   
1983  c2    c2    c2    c2    c2    c2    c2   
1984  a    a    c2    b    b    b    a   
1985  a    b    c2    c2    c2    c2    c2   
1986  b    a    c2    c2    c2    c2    b   
1987  b    b    c2    a    a    b    c2   
1988  c2    c2    c2    c2    c2    c2    c2   
1989  b    b    b    b    c1    b    b   
1990  c1    c1    a    c1    a    c1    c1   
1991  c1    a    b    a    c1    c1    c1   
1992  b    b    a    b    b    a    b   
1993  c2    b    a    a    c2    c2    c2   
1994  c2    c2    b    b    c2    c2    a   
1995  c2    c2    c2    a    c2    c2    c2   
1996  a    a    c2    b    a    c2    b   
1997  c2    b    c2    c2    c2    c2    c2   
1998  a    b    a    b    a    a    a   
  The number of occurrence during 1968-98 (31 years) 
a. Under-offset  5  5  7  8  8  6  8 
b. Over-offset  8  12  4  8  3  6  10 
c. Adverse  18  14  20  15  20  19  13 
  c1. Depriving  6  5  4  5  6  6  4 





Table 5. Estimation results: Panel of annual data from 1969 to 1998 for the ten provinces 
# of observations  300  Uncentered R
2  0.3954   
DF  251  Centered R
2  0.3924   
Durbin-Watson  2.0480  Adjusted R
2  0.2762   
    Variable  Coeff.  Std. error  t-stat.  P values 
Newfoundland  Regional effects  DNfld  40.6321  112.7389  0.3604  0.7188 
 AR(1) coefs  DbNfld, t-1  -0.4773  0.4661  -1.0240  0.3068 
Prind Edward Island  Regional effects  DPEI  40.7244  112.7537  0.3612  0.7183 
 AR(1) coefs  DbPEI, t-1  -0.6945  0.3206  -2.1661  0.0312 
Nova Scotia  Regional effects  DNS  37.8368  112.6256  0.3360  0.7372 
 AR(1) coefs  DbNS, t-1  -0.5971  0.3456  -1.7278  0.0853 
New Brunswick  Regional effects  DNB  38.2821  112.5388  0.3402  0.7340 
 AR(1) coefs  DbNB, t-1  -0.5911  0.1604  -3.6854  0.0003 
Quebec  Regional effects  DQue  92.2446  113.3548  0.8138  0.4165 
 AR(1) coefs  DbQue, t-1  -0.4153  0.2701  -1.5376  0.1254 
Ontario  Regional effects  DOnt  62.4384  112.8863  0.5531  0.5807 
 AR(1) coefs  DbOnt, t-1  -0.1780  0.1911  -0.9314  0.3526 
Manitoba  Regional effects  DMan  30.4535  112.5608  0.2706  0.7870 
 AR(1) coefs  DbMan, t-1  -0.6779  0.3498  -1.9379  0.0538 
Saskatchewan  Regional effects  DSask  61.0104  112.7898  0.5409  0.5890 
 AR(1) coefs  DbSask, t-1  -0.2875  0.2494  -1.1527  0.2501 
Alberta  Regional effects  DAlt  117.5154  112.5967  1.0437  0.2976 
 AR(1) coefs  DbAlt, t-1  -0.3428  0.0705  -4.8616  0.0000 
British Columbia  Regional effects  DbBC, t-1  -0.1164  0.1822  -0.6390  0.5234 
Common Effects (Time)  1969  D1969  -10.4997  157.2093  -0.0668  0.9468 
  1970  D1970  -209.7274  157.2966  -1.3333  0.1836 
  1971  D1971  -40.6433  158.1828  -0.2569  0.7974 
  1972  D1972  230.8262  157.2392  1.4680  0.1434 
  1973  D1973  426.9598  159.6921  2.6736  0.0080 
  1974  D1974  298.0289  160.6690  1.8549  0.0648 
  1975  D1975  8.5967  159.9459  0.0538  0.9572 
  1976  D1976  -290.4284  162.2792  -1.7897  0.0747 
  1977  D1977  248.4696  158.7219  1.5654  0.1187 
  1978  D1978  97.2287  158.9748  0.6116  0.5414 
  1979  D1979  423.6346  160.4548  2.6402  0.0088 
  1980  D1980  71.7904  164.5700  0.4362  0.6630 
  1981  D1981  -496.3783  158.6752  -3.1283  0.0020 
  1982  D1982  -658.4063  162.0298  -4.0635  0.0001 
  1983  D1983  169.9729  169.8754  1.0006  0.3180 
  1984  D1984  197.8481  162.0848  1.2207  0.2234 
  1985  D1985  -17.1753  157.7146  -0.1089  0.9134 
  1986  D1986  -275.8983  157.8961  -1.7473  0.0818 
  1987  D1987  127.8481  162.6021  0.7863  0.4325 
  1988  D1988  238.1846  159.1479  1.4966  0.1357 
  1989  D1989  -357.1840  158.9820  -2.2467  0.0255 
  1990  D1990  -716.4259  160.8356  -4.4544  0.0000 
  1991  D1991  -610.1290  169.8591  -3.5920  0.0004 
  1992  D1992  -168.4409  162.6728  -1.0355  0.3015 
  1993  D1993  203.7636  159.2093  1.2799  0.2018 
  1994  D1994  291.3355  158.4060  1.8392  0.0671 
  1995  D1995  324.0233  159.6347  2.0298  0.0434 
  1996  D1996  76.0779  160.0900  0.4752  0.6350 
  1997  D1997  146.3305  158.1006  0.9256  0.3556 
  1998  D1998  172.4272  158.2620  1.0895  0.2770  
 
 
Table 6. Ratio of changes in entitlements to those in per capita bases at the average tax rate 
  Nfld  PEI  NS  NB  Que  Man  Sask 
1969  -0.75    -1.40    -1.40    -1.39    -0.67    -2.62    -0.88   
1970  -2.24    -1.74    -2.36    -3.17    -4.72    -3.66    1.80   
1971  -1.48    -1.74    122.35    0.99    -2.66    -1.44    -0.36   
1972  -3.83    -1.51    -2.90    -2.13    -2.17    1.15    0.14   
1973  -2.21    -1.95    -1.72    -4.70    4.17    33.90    -5.35   
1974  -5.90    -1.86    -2.19    -0.04    0.20    -0.61    -0.07   
1975  3.84    2.21    -8.14    1.27    0.30    4.95    -2.55   
1976  -1.49    -0.70    -1.92    -1.70    -0.27    -0.64    -0.67   
1977  -0.19    0.28    0.00    -2.64    -0.43    -0.38    -0.17   
1978  0.12    -2.44    0.93    -1.37    1.53    -59.06    -0.53   
1979  -3.21    -2.99    -25.91    -0.61    1.10    -6.55    -1.61   
1980  1.68    -4.10    -5.75    -1.95    0.41    0.36    -7.16   
1981  -1.65    -1.52    -3.20    0.06    4.51    5.07    -1.75   
1982  -2.45    -2.00    -55.59    0.49    2.33    3.67    -0.30   
1983  -3.75    -4.16    -2.41    -2.71    -26.98    -2.83    -14.02   
1984  13.12    -9.42    1.24    2.56    5.39    1.43    -0.33   
1985  -0.43    -8.40    3.67    -17.06    3.14    -5.17    4.82   
1986  2.43    -0.38    0.01    0.91    0.02    0.22    -3.75   
1987  -1.11    -1.30    -0.73    -0.82    -0.76    -1.41    -2.21   
1988  -1.02    -1.00    -1.02    -0.97    -1.17    -1.03    0.03   
1989  -0.96    -0.97    -0.92    -1.09    -1.03    -1.17    -0.94   
1990  -2.94    -2.25    1.85    -6.65    0.31    -2.89    -3.94   
1991  -1.82    -0.60    -1.43    -0.79    -2.78    -1.44    -1.47   
1992  -2.76    -1.45    -0.09    -1.30    -2.33    -0.56    -1.61   
1993  -0.65    -1.49    1.40    -1.11    -0.63    -0.63    -0.59   
1994  -3.28    -1.55    -1.99    -1.42    -2.98    3.11    -0.48   
1995  -2.63    -1.58    -3.66    -0.53    -5.17    5.42    0.72   
1996  -0.44    -0.57    -0.42    -1.25    -0.67    -0.36    -1.27   
1997  -4.06    -3.21    -3.60    -1.74    18.37    0.84    -2.89   
1998  -0.80    -1.07    -0.50    -1.20    -0.75    -0.72    -0.74   




Table 7.  Detailed responses 
  Nfld  PEI  NS  NB  Que  Man  Sask 
1969  a  f  f  f  a  g  a 
1970  g  f  g  g  g  g  d 
1971  b  b  h  h  c  b  e 
1972  c  b  c  c  c  h  h 
1973  c  b  b  c  h  h  c 
1974  c  b  c  e  h  e  e 
1975  d  d  g  d  d  d  g 
1976  b  e  b  b  e  e  e 
1977  a  d  a  g  a  a  a 
1978  h  c  h  b  h  c  e 
1979  c  c  c  e  h  c  b 
1980  d  g  g  f  d  d  g 
1981  f  f  g  d  d  d  f 
1982  g  g  g  d  d  d  a 
1983  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1984  d  g  d  d  d  d  a 
1985  e  c  h  c  h  c  h 
1986  h  e  h  h  h  h  c 
1987  b  b  e  e  e  b  c 
1988  b  b  b  e  b  b  h 
1989  e  e  e  b  f  b  e 
1990  g  g  d  g  d  g  g 
1991  f  a  f  a  g  f  f 
1992  g  f  a  f  g  a  f 
1993  a  f  d  f  a  a  a 
1994  c  b  b  b  c  h  e 
1995  c  b  c  e  c  h  h 
1996  e  e  e  b  e  e  b 
1997  c  c  c  b  h  h  c 
1998  e  b  e  b  e  e  e 
# Case a  3  1  2  1  3  3  5 
# Case b  4  9  4  7  1  4  2 
# Case c  8  5  6  4  5  4  5 
# Case d  3  2  3  4  6  5  1 
# Case e  4  4  4  5  4  4  7 
# Case f  2  5  2  4  1  1  3 
# Case g  4  4  5  3  3  3  3 
# Case h  2  0  4  2  7  6  4 
# of Destabilizing 
Case (c+d+g+h)  17  11  18  13  21  18  13 
% of Destabilizing 
Case (c+d+g+h)  56.7%  36.7%  60.0%  43.3%  70.0%  60.0%  43.3% 
a. Negative tax base change, under-offsetting, stabilizing   
b. Negative tax base change, over-offsetting, stabilizing   
c. Negative tax base change, over-offset, destabilizing 
d. Negative tax base change, adverse effect, destabilizing 
e. Positive tax base change, under-offsetting, stabilizing   
f. Positive tax base change, over-offsetting, stabilizing   
g. Positive tax base change, over-offsetting, destabilizing 
h. Positive tax base change, unnecessary compensation, destabilizing 
 